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LrnoR LAw-LrnoR-MAN°AGEl\1ENT Rm.ATIONS ACT-APPLICABLE REMEDIES 
WHEN AN EMPLOY.ER TRANSFERS TO A NEw LocATION To Avom DEALING WITH 
A UmoN-An interstate trucking concern with depots in numerous cities, was 
approached by a union seeking recognition as the bargaining representative of 
the office and clerical workers at one of the depots. The employer, after interro-
gating the employees involved as to their union affiliation, transferred the 
clerical work done at that depot to an office in a different city, but continued 
operating the trucking depot itself. The clerical employees were discharged but 
were offered reinstatement at the new location, together with reimbursement of 
the expenses of moving to the new location. Held, the employer violated sec-
tions 8(a)(l), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.1 
The Board awarded the discharged employees back pay from the date of dis-
charge to the date of the offer of reinstatement at the new location, ordered the 
employer to offer the discharged employees reinstatement if and when it resumed 
operations at the new location but, with Member Murdock dissenting, refused 
to order the resumption of the clerical operations at the old location. Tennessee-
Carolina Transportation Co.,. 108 N.L.R.B. No. 179 (1954). 
l Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) 
§§158(a), (b) and (c) •. 
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The traditional affirmative remedy applied by the Board in case of a nm-away 
shop has been back pay from the date of discharge to the date of an offer of 
reinstatement, together with an order of reinstatement at either the old or new 
location, and if the latter is chosen, reimbursement of expenses of moving the 
employees and their families to the new location. 2 Where the original move-
ment to the new location was an unfair labor practice, such an order has invaria-
bly been enforced by the circuit courts.3 In no case, however, has the Board 
ordered a nm-away shop to be returned to its old location.4 This is true regard-
less of whether all or only part of the operations were moved,5 or whether the 
moving by the employer was or was not, in itself, an unfair labor practice. The 
Board has, on occasion, indicated that its reluctance to issue such an order is 
based on the failure of the union to request such an order,6 the possibility of 
prejudicing other employees who have already moved to the new location,7 and 
the existence of a substantially equivalent remedy in the order for reimburse-
ment of expenses of moving the employees and their families to the new loca-
tion. 8 There is little doubt but that the Board has power to issue such an order 
under the broad language of section IO(c) of the act.9 The Board has affirma-
tively stated that it has such power, 10 and the courts have repeatedly affirmed 
the Board's right to make any non-capricious affirmative order which effectuates 
the policies of the act.11 One objection to an order for the return of the run-away 
2 Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); S and K Knee Pants Co., 2 
N.L.R.B. 940 (1937); 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVB BARGAINING 992 
(1940). Although this is the ordinary remedy, the Board in its discretion has ordered only 
back pay and reinstatement without moving expenses. Robinson v. Golluber, 2 N.L.R.B. 
460 (1936). On one occasion the alternative order included a provision for the payment 
of the employee's expenses of commuting biweekly to the new location. Jacob H. Klotz, 
13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939). But the Board refused this latter type remedy, although recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner, in New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 117 (1953). 
a NLRB v. Gerity Whitaker Co., (6th Cir. 1942) 137 F. (2d) 198; Schieber Millinery 
Co. v. NLRB, (8th Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 281. Compare NLRB v. Remington Rand, 
Inc., (2d Cir. 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862, in which the order to pay moving expenses of 
employees was denied enforcement. In the latter case, the run-away shop had not itself 
violated the act. 
4 That this is largely an interstate problem is indicated by the fact that the state 
labor boards in New York and Pennsylvania have never passed on the question. 
5 Robinson v. Golluber, note 2 supra; Omaha Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 878 (1938). 
6 Jacob H. Klotz, note 2 supra. 
7Jbid. 
s Shieber Millinery Co., note 2 supra. That the alternative remedy applied in most 
cases by the Board is not substantially equivalent, see the dissenting opinions by Member 
Smith in Schieber Millinery Co., note 2 supra, and in Williams Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 
715 (1941), which agree with Member Murdock in the principal case. 
9 The Board may take "such affirmative action • • • as will effectuate the policies of 
this Act." 61 Stat. L. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §l60(c). The pre-enactment mate-
rials indicate that the framers intended to invest the Board with the powers of a court of 
equity (except for powers of enforcement) insofar as such powers would effectuate the 
policies of the act. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2, 3 (1935). Also see 1939 
Wis. L. REv. 445. 
10 Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948). 
11 NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 58 S.Ct. 571 (1938); 
Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, (8th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 960. 
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shop might be that such an order is punitive and not remedial.12 This objection, 
however, is irreconcilable with the maxim that the policies of the act are best 
effectuated by a return of the parties to the status quo ante the unfair labor 
practice,13 and the statement of the Board that the status quo ante may be best 
achieved by ordering the employer to return to the old location.14 On the other 
hand, the Board's consistent use of an admittedly second-best remedy may be 
explained on the theory that ordering the employer to return to the old location 
would work such a dislocation in the business of the employer as to disrupt 
interstate commerce itself and consequently not effectuate the policies of the 
act.15 Such an order, although used to enforce a strictly public rather than a 
private right,16 has in it some of the characteristics of an equity order under the 
"balance of convenience doctrine,"17 and this might well explain the orders 
made in the run-away shop cases prior to the present one.18 But such a theory 
would not explain the failure to issue the order to return to the old location in 
the principal case, where the dislocation caused by such an order would obviously 
not disrupt interstate commerce. In the principal case the Board found that the 
employer was motivated by both anti-union and economic considerations when 
it moved its operations to the new location, and the existence of these economic 
considerations was the mitigating factor which caused the Board to refuse to 
issue the order to return to the old location. This approach is subject to the 
difficulty that, while an employer motivated only by economic considerations 
may move his business anywhere he chooses without interference from the act,19 
an employer motivated wholly by anti-union considerations in moving his opera-
tions will undoubtedly consider the purely economic advantages of the various 
12 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941). That the same 
problem (remedial or punitive) exists under some state labor relations acts, see Folding 
Furniture Works v. WLRB, 232 Wis. 170, 285 N.W. 851 (1939). This was the rationale 
used by Judge L. Hand in refusing to enforce a Board order to pay moving expenses to 
the new location in NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., note 3 supra, but the case may be 
distinguished on other grounds. That the origin of the analysis is obscure, is not found in 
the act, and probably lies in dictum, see 89 UNIV. PA. L. R:sv. 648 at 655 (1941). 
1a NLRB v. Lightner Pub. Corp., (7th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 237. 
14 Jacob H. Klotz, note 2 supra. 
15 The amount of the dislocation of the employer's business has traditionally been one 
of the considerations of the Board. Moorseville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, ( 4th Cir. 1938) 
97 F. (2d) 959. 
10 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct. 569 (1940). 
17 Cases on the balance of convenience rule may be found in 39 A.L.R. 896 (1925) 
and 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 881 (1911). As applied by the Board, however, it would not be the 
hardship to one of the parties which would control the application of the doctrine, but the 
degree of actual dislocation of interstate commerce-a public hardship. It should be noted 
that the doctrine was used in equity for temporary rather than final relief. 
18 The fact situations in all of the run-away shop cases prior to the present one indi-
cate that the employer had invested large sums in the movement. Even here, however, 
equity courts have shown both a power and a willingness to force an employer to resume 
operations at the old location. Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S. 
898 (1936). See also 36 CoL. L. R:sv. 776 (1936). 
10 NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. I, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937); NLRB 
v. Cape County Milling Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 543. 
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places he may go, thus automatically laying the foundation for a claim of dual 
motivation and mitigation of the stricter remedy. If nothing else, however, at 
least the principal case indicates the need for a thorough explanation by the 
Board of the rationale it uses in determining the remedy to be used in the run-
away shop cases. 
John F. Dodge, Jr., S.Ed. 
